Investigation's role not to place blame

Through Murky Waters

The independent commission currently investigating the security and intelligence failures in the U.S. government associated with the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon was created by the U.S. Congress in November 2002. The legislation creating the commision came after a seperate presidential commission failed to gather the information it required to complete its investigation earlier that year. The current commission is composed of 10 congressmen — five from each party — and is scheduled to have finished its investigation by May, six months before the presidential election in November.

The commission is charged with determining what went on in the U.S. government in regards to security prior to Sept. 11. To date, it has examined countless documents, as well as staff from both the current George W. Bush administration and the Bill Clinton administration before it. Now, Condoleeza Rice, Bush's national security adviser, as well as the president and vice president themselves, are scheduled to testify in front of the commission.

The commission treads a fine line, however, between its duty to determine where the U.S. government committed errors and the temptation to use this knowledge to assign blame for the tragedy to one or more individuals in the government.

There can be no doubt that somewhere within the U.S. government there was an intelligence failure prior to September 2001. Errors of this sort are not unprecedented, but unfortunately, this time, the error resulted in a lack of anticipation of the terrorist attacks against New York and Washington, D.C. These errors are an internal problem concerning the agencies involved, with the responsibility of dealing with those at fault squarely on the shoulders of the chiefs of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and others.

The investigative commission can and should aid the various agencies in their internal investigations through its work to determine what occurred in each prior to the terrorist attacks. The commission's mission should be a purely fact-finding one, however, and not one that seeks to do the job of the agencies' internal investigations.

If the errors lie within the highest levels of any of the agencies, then the responsibility falls to Bush to appropriately handle the situation, whether through removal of the offending parties or some other method. The Bush administration should investigate the directors and upper levels of the agencies involved independently to ensure that any errors committed were not committed at those levels and if they were, that they will not occur again.

The commission must not use its power and influence on the government and the media to place blame on anyone, or to absolve anyone of blame. Unless the commission finds an egregious error, it should restrain itself from pointing a condemning finger at any one person, or even any one organization.

This commission runs the risk that, if it is quick to pin the blame for the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on any one person or in any one place, it will lose credibility in this election year — it would be seen as a partisan attempt to support or undermine Bush's reelection campaign. The commission should prepare to present all information it discovers to Congress. In turn, congress should not hesitate to place the blame on an individual or agency if it is warranted by gross negligence or inaction, but there must be no accusations made without sufficient support or resolve to take an appropriate course of action.

Bush and Rice have born the brunt of criticism for failing to adequately prepare the nation for the possibility of terrorist attacks against civilian targets in the United States, and stand to lose considerable political ground if the criticism turns into fact — the presidential elections in November will be greatly influenced by whether or not the president's actions before and after Sept. 11 were justified. It is the responsibility of the commission to report only the facts it discovers and leave the debate of the significance of these facts to Congress and the administration.

The ultimate responsibility for the interpretation of the findings falls first to Congress, to determine if any legal fault lies with any officials and, ultimately, to the American people to determine whether their elected officials truly represent their interests.

Alex Sirney is a freshman SMAD and anthropology major.